EIU - Could water scarcity lead to water wars?

It is dreadful to even begin to contemplate the prospect of water wars.

While the issue pops up occasionally and is pressing to various degrees in several parts of the world, much less is known of real policy/ies being implemented to manage, mitigate or overcome the macro problem altogether.

Despite instances of acute shortages, it would seem to me that so far water scarcity is very localized. It is mostly tackled in ways deemed as pragmatic rather than scientific. Such approaches do fix the urgency of the minute but hardly address the structural issue, if and where one is identified. Here a line must be drawn to distinguish between droughts on a return period and the unavailability of water.

There have always been regions prone to water scarcity for natural reasons.
Climate factors cannot be micro-managed or reinvented which is why large human settlements set down on fertile soils close to river banks, water bodies or areas of regular rainfall. 

To answer a troubling question, I'd say that I do not envisage a water war as such.
There will continue to be water conflicts and strife at local and regional level. The clashes may perhaps scale up in seriousness, tone and frequency. The geographic location of potential conflict should remain largely unaltered. Unless the root-causes there are dealt with meaningfully to literally quench the thirst permanently.

The top priority of policymakers is to heed the call from those who have already closely studied the problem. Their conclusions, recommendations based on science, practicalities and volumes - natural and both human and material - must be taken into account building feasible long-lasting solutions.

If humans can get it all right, it will still be Mother-Nature having the final say...

TEc - How to deal with the world's most dangerous regime? - It's a catch-22!

Opinion does not count for regimes such as North Korea's. We've seen it before across the world. The true mindset of tinpot dictators, 'goldpot' dictators or simply strong-headed strongmen, as single leaders, is predictable. It delivers behaviour in whimsical if not sickly fashion regardless. As long as they are seen to command full authority in the State's hierarchy, mainly among relevant people in arms to toy with, nothing else ever seems to matter.

This is why NK needs to be closely monitored and eventually prevented from building up more threatening and far-reaching deadly weapons.
Can it be done?
Should it be done?
Will it be done?
Speculate we may but the overwhelming issue is crystal clear. No one in his sane mind would wish for war - knowing the odds and the potential for rapid escalation and outrageous loss of life - but a longstanding question looms larger than ever: what to do if and when NK becomes the full-fledged nuclear power it appears so intent on becoming?
While existing nuclear powers are taken for granted - as it is we assume existing nuclear weapons to be in safe hands (even if we cannot be entirely sure) - NK has drawn oversized attention for its special focus on getting there as well.
Their purpose is also very clear to most, a quest to bully other nations and perpetuate regime survival in the current form. If such a day does dawn, whoever leads the regime might also attempt to blackmail South Korea into reunification on the North's terms.
The stakes are therefore extremely high in Asia's Far East. A catch-22 situation.
Geopolitics there is being kicked around by a single country whose survival has remained assured by its giant neighbour. China could cause NK to collapse in weeks if it so wished.
However, it will only act in the event that it should no longer regard NK as a convenient buffer:
to contain American presence in the peninsula at arm's length,
to keep Japan uneasy on its toes but, barred by its own constitution, hardly able to do much else and, importantly,
to strengthen and advance China's own case, influence and interests in the region.
For China, NK is the convenient State and I don't see how this will change in the near future.